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This paper is about the unreliability of crime statistics in 
developing countries. There are many operational, technical,
institutional, social and cultural reasons for these 
inaccuracies. What the police do when an offence is reported and 
whether they treat it as a crime is the most critical factor 
determining the nature and extent of law and order records. Much 
crime goes unreported because of distance, environmental 
conditions, diffidence, fear of retribution and distrust or lack 
of confidence in the police. Many other offences, though 
reported, are never recorded because of incompetence, corruption
and an unwillingness on the part of the police to become
embroiled in domestic conflicts. And many crimes are not 
considered as crimes because the offences relate to traditional 
customs that form part of long accepted tribal and religious 
codes of behaviour. At the same time minor infringements of the 
law and petty contraventions are actively pursued by the police. 
The resulting crime statistics thus provide a dubious and 
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FOREWORD by MICHAEL WARD
The following IDS Discussion Paper has been prepared by Dr Ralph 
Tanner, a regular contributor to the Institute's annual course in 
Development Statistics. The paper is based on the series of 
lectures on the problems of interpreting law and order statistics 
that Dr Tanner presents to this course. Dr Tanner has had
lengthy and extensive experience as an administrator, magistrate 
and member of official commission of enquiry into police, prison 
and judicial procedures in many developing countries. In these 
various capacities he himself has frequently encountered serious 
difficulties in trying to use and interpret official statistics 
on crime and police operations. Because this paper distills 
much of Dr Tanner's experience and his specific research in this 
area, it was felt to be useful and worthwhile to have his views 
more widely disseminated. No new theory or data are presented 
in the field of law and order but it is believed this paper will 
undoubtedly stimulate renewed interest, comment and discussion on 
this topic. The field of law and order statistics is an area of 
statistical activity that has received scant attention in both 
offical circles and the literature in developing countries.
Dr Tanner highlights how difficult it is to make head or tail of 
published data relating to law and order. It seems almost
impossible to determine the real trends in crime. He clearly 
demonstrates that a multiplicity of social, institutional and 
technical factors underlie what data are presented and influence 
how they are produced. He contends that, implicitly and
explicitly, the data reflect only those features which, over 
time, the authorities charged with the duty to maintain lav; and 
order in the community, decide to record officially as 'crime'. 
He suggests, too, that the amount of reported crime is not 
independent of the number of peope actually involved in its
attempted suppression.
The problems identified by Dr Tanner are widespread. But many 
have a special significance in developing countries where 
physical and logistical difficulties create additional obstacles 
that have to be overcome. A multiplicity of potential social 
conflicts can also arise. It is evident that customary and 
cultural factors have a considerable bearing on what does or does 
not constitute a crime and affect what actions in practice are
regarded as essentially 'criminal'. The area of
'contraventions' is equally vague and arbitrary and subject to 
substantial variations over time. Furthermore, and possibly
even more important, much crime goes undetected, although whether 
more so than in advanced industrial countries it is impossible to 
say.
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It must be recognised that there is often an inherent conflict 
between customary and cultural codes of conduct observed by a 
community and those formally prescribed criminal laws 
subsequently introduced by the state but originally devised and 
developed in the context of literate urban industrial societies. 
What in different societies would be considered as callous acts 
of barbarism inflicted by one section of the community on others 
who are either too young or too weak to object or to have any 
formal redress against the perpetrators, may often be performed 
in the name of culture and tradition. Criminal acts of assault 
such as infanticide, ritual murder, child abuse, the 
traditional religious or tribal circumcision of young children - 
may still be regarded as socially accceptable in some societies 
even if they are no'longer regarded as legal. Sadly, such acts 
of personal offence, ritual mutilation and violence are often 
condoned rather than condemned by the community, despite the fact 
that laws have now been introduced in most countries to halt 
these practices. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, in the same
countries and at the same time, minor trading and vagrancy 
transgressions involving hawkers and pedlars are sometimes 
harshly punished. The severe treatment which petty stealing 
receives from both the courts and police compares unfavourably 
with the unofficial blind eye that is turned to the huge 
rake-offs made by some politicians and senior civil servants 
handling large public service contracts. The 'backsheesh1,
'dash', and personal cuts commonly associated with official deals 
are discreetly ignored because certain senior, executive and 
decision-making people or their friends are themselves involved. 
Whilst this particular issue is not the main concern of Dr 
Tanner's treatise, it does reflect the basic question as to what 
action - across countries - is or is not considered as a crime 
and how such perceptions change over time. Whether an act is
merely a contravention (of perhaps some arbitrary local bye-law) 
that is easy to enforce - like speeding or parking offences - or 
a 'basic' crime is another factor complicating the situation. 
The problem is compounded when, as implied earlier, it is tacitly 
acknowledged that many serious offences relating to traditional 
customs are considered socially acceptable and may even be 
practised by the leading dignatories and families in the land. 
Even if such acts are considered crimes it is difficult to ensure 
they are reported and even more difficult to secure any 
convictions on these counts. The covert and even overt social 
pressures for the suppression of such investigations are strong.
For a variety of complex and often unrelated reasons, the basic 
crime statistics are frequently at fault and invariably 
inconsistent over time. It follows that the associated crime 
jdetection, solution and indictment rates will be similarly 
[difficult to interpret. The interrelationships between law and 
iorder data are confusing and subject to bias and error to an
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unknown extent. What is a crime, what is regarded legally as a
crime, what is reported or is detected as a crime and what is 
eventually recorded as a crime, are all different aspects of the 
law and order statistics problem and make analysis all the more 
difficult. The nature of police evidence, type of prosecution 
witnesses and methods of court proceedings are also important in 
assessing statistics on convictions.
Dr Tanner describes in some detail how, in practice, those 
incidents that the authorities choose to regard and define as 
'crimes' are actually recorded. There is little spatial or 
temporal consistency in such procedures. Attitudes differ
significantly depending upon the time of day, week, month or 
year; the place of the incident; location and proximity of the 
police unit; the persons involved; and who records the 
incident.
Changes both in the law and how the law is enforced at the 
institutional level also affect the statistics on crime. It is 
perhaps less evident, however, that changes in economic 
conditions can also exert a direct influence on the data. For 
instance, the inexorable march of inflation can turn 'petty' 
crimes into 'serious' crimes as the value of stolen property 
rises above a certain pre-defined and arbitrary financial
limit regarded as 'petty'. Furthermore, economic conditions can 
exert other influences on the nature of offences committed. 
They may also have a direct bearing on how many resources are 
allocated and applied to law and order and its maintenance. In 
the ultimate analysis, the data - whether referring to 
identification or detection - relate only to contact. The
greater the resources put into this field and the greater the 
access to problem areas, the more information will become
available. In that sense, at least, it can be argued that, 
indirectly (and superficially), 'the police create the crime'. 
The desire of the police to detect more illegal acts, to achieve 
a higher level of success in solving crimes and, in the final
result, to secure a larger number of convictions inevitably leads 
to a greater volume of criminal statistics. Their success in 
obtaining the confidence and cooperation of the public in both 
reporting crime and assisting the authorities in its detection is 
equally important.
All these features are discussed in some detail by Dr Tanner who 
illustrates what can and does happen using actual examples drawn 
both from his own experience and that recorded by others. The
problems ate clearly as much 'institutional' as real and a 
careful description of the procedures adopted in recording events 
related to questions of lav; and order maintenance is a necessary 
prerequisite. Before anything can be done to rectify a
•.statistical situation that is widely recognised as being 
.inconsistent, unstandardised and unsatisfactory, some semblance 
of order must be introduced into crime reporting methods. It is
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only when policy-makers can have greater confidence in the 
official data on crime that the law and order authorities make 
available to them that they will be able to understand better the 
actual situation of 'lawlessness’ prevailing in their society. 
Only then can they consider taking more appropriate and effective 
action to deal with the problems identified.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this discussion paper is not just to criticise the 
law and order statistics of developing countries. It is
intended to show as widely as possible the ways in which such 
statistics are likely to be unreliable in any country and how 
these circumstances are likely to be particularly influential in 
causing inaccurate data in developing countries.
The law and order statistics are the results of certain social 
behaviours being recorded by law and order institutions and their 
personnel. Since human behaviour at any time is difficult to 
record accurately and numerically, records are dominated by 
uncertainties as to what is recorded. . In addition there is a 
large 'dark' area covering what is not recorded relating to 
crimes which have been committed but which are not reported to 
the police.
It is generally agreed that this 'dark area' constitutes the main 
difficulty in using law and order statistics for social planning. 
Furthermore, the statistics actually generated are the product of 
particular institutional processes which modify them for a wide 
variety of social, economic and religious purposes. In the 
developed world considerable work has been done by criminologists 
to improve the value of the statistics and to produce additional 
data so that the whole material gathered can be of greater value 
for diagnostic and planning purposes. To a very large extent 
these improvements have been made by professional researchers not 
directly involved in law and order organisations and . their 
processes.
Much progress towards achieving higher standards of accuracy in 
law and order statistics has been made in recent years. This has 
required not only the interest of many professional 
criminologists but also the money to support their research. It 
has necessitated the consent and interest of the institutions 
themselves. More importantly the researchers have worked mainly 
in countries of some social and political stability. 
Unfortunately, in situations of active or passive civil unrest, 
it is difficult to implement improvements in law and order 
statistics and such data must be regarded as being extremely 
unreliable.
A much more difficult area to research has always been actual 
police practices. What the polic do when a crime is reported to 
them and how they use their discretion on whether to proceed with 
a case (and under what circumstances) is vague and undefined. 
The extent of legal, quasi-legal and illegal practices in the law 
enforcement system in any country is rarely known and their 
effect on law and order statistics can only be guessed at.
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In the first instance any consideration of crime and case rates 
must depend on knowing the relevant population for that area. 
An accurate and comprehensive census requires both a prolonged 
period of social and political stability and a widespread 
bureaucratic detachment from the social, economic and political 
implication of the results that are obtained. Some developing 
countries do not have effective control over their whole 
territories and it is doubtful whether a proper population census 
could be carried out in many disputed and unsettled areas of 
Africa and Asia.
Population totals provide the basic evidence in politicl 
struggles for various forms of regional autonomy and community 
representation. Consequently, much data from the past population 
censuses of certain countries, eg Lebanon and Nigeria have been 
very suspect. Where government servants' pay is related to the 
number of people they represent, there must always be a human 
tendency to inflate local population figures. The data collected 
may also be at fault because in some developing countries the 
enumerators are local people who are themselves subject to 
pressures over what they should record. They may be unable to 
list the population because in being regarded as government they 
are considered to represent a particular political party. There 
is thus widespread suspicion as to the uses that may subsequently 
be made of these records. Data may also be inconsistent because 
many developing countries have geographically mobile 'nomadic' 
populations which have a traditonal disregard for 'artificial' 
political or national boundaries.
Lastly, much depends on the timing of a census if it is to be 
used for the assessment of rates of criminality. The population 
may vary with the time of the year. Large numbers of migratory 
male workers may return home for the month around Christmas or 
Ramadan. A census taken at any other time would disclose a 
disproportionate number of adult women and children. Criminalty 
as expressed in crime rates will vary substantially between these 
two situations. Similarly, if a census only covers those who 
sleep in the areas to be counted and not where they spend their 
days, the criminality ratios for cities will be inaccurate since 
they will exclude 'commuters' and tourists who must certainly 
include some criminals and victims who fall within the proportion 
of all crimes committed. (Skogan, 1975).
This paper considers, in particular, the problematical issues and 
questions surrounding these statistics in the developing world 
where law and order data may not exist at all or only in an 
irregular and summary form. In such countries special conditions 
prevail which may make the data even more unreliable. These 
circumstances include, inter alia:-
- Periodic and prolonged civil unrest in which a civil
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structure of law and order institutions ceases to function 
effectively, eg National wars, civil wars, guerrilla 
insurgencies, coup d'etats, etc.
- Revolutionary reorganisation in which a reforming social 
structure is imposed on a country from the top without 
an adequate administrative infrastructure to support any 
radical social, political and economic change.
- Situations of rapid social change with unequally distributed 
benefits resulting in adverse social consequences and an 
uncontrolled impact on different population groups.
- Famine and national disasters, eg flooding, earthquakes, etc.
- Disturbances in neighbouring countries causing, for example, 
a massive and uncontrolled influx of refugees. In these 
situations it is unlikely that the public will view the 
institution of government as particularly useful for 
maintaining law and order or that the institutions themselves 
will perform any regular law and order functions, much less 
record their activities in any regular and controlled way. 
There are thus long periods of social instability in which it 
is difficult to conduct any enquiry in comparative safety.
In such situations the question of accuracy becomes 
irrelevant.
In many developing countries there is an almost total absence of 
background data on which to build research. Only a few countries 
such as India have detailed records and some like Uganda have 
gaps existing for several years. Others publish no records at 
all. In Iran, neither the present nor previous government
appears to know how many people it has executed or imprisoned in 
a year or whether these official actions have followed any legal 
process whatsoever. There is, unfortunately, very little
published research by impartial and trained researchers on the 
functions of law and order institutions in the developing world 
in comparison with the large amount published in professional 
journals of the developed world.
The whole consideration of law and order statistics is pervaded 
by the view that the law can be regarded as a panacea for social 
evils. It seems that the very passage of a law will have a 
quasi-magical effect; but the mere passage of a law cannot be 
expected to solve problems without the support of adequate 
enforcing institutions and public opinion. The written law 
alone does not differentiate illegal from legal acts. People 
make this distinction, so that anything recorded in law and order 
statistics has a situational perspective (Daudistel et al 1979) . 
In developing countries the statistics recorded on law and order 
reflect a dialectic conflict between modern and traditional
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jurisdictions. It has been suggested that, to a limited extent, 
the data can be viewed more as indices of acculturation to the 
urban industrial society and its legal institutions than of 
lawlessness per se.(Brillon, 1980).
The conclusions of this work are designed to have an overall 
application to any consideration of law and order statistics. An 
enormous amount of crime goes unrecorded. When this is combined 
with the processing of information designed only to accord with 
the official wishes and unofficial needs of the institutions and 
personnel involved, it leads to published figures which have no 
necessary or inevitable relationships to the events to which they 
purport to relate. It is doubtful whether such data have any use 
as basic social evidence.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIRD WORLD LAW AND ORDER ADMINISTRATION
A priori, in the examination of law and order statistics it is 
essential to consider the whole framework within which they are 
produced. An understanding of the relationship between the 
'rational goal model' of legal administration and the 'organic 
model' in which the administration responds to the local 
situation is important in this respect. The quasi-dominance of 
the bureaucratic imperative influences the particular manner in 
which administrations exercise their authority.
A The Rational Goal Model
In this approach the government develops institutions to deal 
with law and order problems as a result of studying the problem. 
It reaches a decision as to the best possible means of attaining 
its objectives with a Weberian rationality in much the same way 
as a shoe company sets out to mass-produce low priced footwear. 
This is perhaps the way in which the government of a developing 
country would present its law and order structure to an 
outsider's enquiries. Such an ideal form is rarely, if ever, 
achieved for a wide range of reasons:
- Any decision maker is faced with an existing 
institutional structure, a de facto heritage, 
about which he can do very little. This provides 
the building blocks with which any law and order 
institution has to be constructed or reconstructed, 
eg the colonial heritage, cultural tradition, 
language, comunications and the environment generally. 
Particular developing countries have often grafted the 
people, habits and institutions left by colonial rule on 
top of their own indigenous practices.
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- Any decision maker is faced with a multitude of known 
alternatives in law and order administration. There 
are also perhaps just as many of which he is unaware - 
either from the exigencies of the situation or because 
of the behaviour of the organisation in which he is 
working. The political decision to concentrate 
Tanzanians in villages led to the deliberate 
misinforming of government officials about the 
progress of this movement (Samoff, 1981) and within it 
a further restraint on relationships with the
police can be inferred (Mwapachu, 1976)
- There are barriers to collecting adequate information 
about the variety of 'acceptable' goals and policies and 
to obtaining the basic data generally. Situations
in which the actual number of cattle thefts was probably 
nine times higher than the official figure (Tanner,1966) 
make rational planning of anti-rustling by the police 
impossible.
- The personal needs, commitments, inhibitions and 
inadequacies of decision-makers sometimes interfere 
with rational assessments (Lindblom, 1959). No 
public office-holders involved in law and order 
decisions can ignore the possible effects on their 
own political futures of government policies which
may involve their own imprisonment, exile or execution.
- There may be structural difficulties within law and 
order institutions as well as between them and the 
legislative and executive branches of government.
These may involve limits on the administrators' 
control over subordinates, standard operating 
procedures which have become ritualised, conflicts 
between those in the field and those in administration, 
competitive behaviour between different branches of 
government, fear of alienating those in power and so 
on.
- Also to be considered is the deviant behaviour of 
individual administrators and the extent to which this 
deviance has become institutionalised in widespread 
corruption (Scott 1969; Wraith and Simkins 1963;
Greenstone 1966). The alleged widespread corruption 
in the Nigerian customs service (Economist, 17 July 
1952) makes their statistics relating to that period 
questionable. In practice law and order is a political 
process and no political system even approximates the 
ideal rational policymaking proces.
Law and order statistics produced according to the rational goal
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model, can be assessed relatively easily only in terms 
of unattained accuracy.
B The organic model
In this situation law and order organisations are assumed to 
develop, change, and even decline over time. They are shaped by 
the varied exigencies and contingencies of their effective 
internal and external environment. This is an incremental 
process in which a developing nation may be subject to pressure 
over which it has little or no control. These factors will
affect not only the nature of law and order in general but also
have an impact, in particular, on the institutions concerned. 
They will influence how their policies function and especially 
how their activities are ultimately recorded in their statistics.
- Economic factors Most countries have the law and order 
systems they can afford which are not necesarily the most
effective. Exchange rates and foreign currency reserves govern 
the availability of transport and its use; the mobility of 
police affects both their proactive and reactive relationship to 
crime, criminals and the general public. When the whole area is 
impoverished by civil strife, official duties are dropped as 
individual personalities take over and their needs take 
precedence over official role performance (Southall, 1980). 
Again, the statistics coming from a court run by a well-paid and 
experienced judge will be very different fom that coming from
another court in which the judge is markedly less well paid and 
of lesser experience.
Environmental factors Such phenomena as deserts and jungles 
have a significant effect on the policing of constituent 
territories. Famines and floods, islands and straight-line 
international borders each in their way predetermine law and 
order priorities. Operational action therefore requires the 
division of limited funds to deal with crises when geographical 
anomalies or environmental difficulties involve considerable 
expenditures before the police can be usefully deployed on the 
ground. Any great dependence on international aid in itself 
raises further issues of control, quite apart from the reactions 
of personnel to what they may see as the loss of their dependence 
and personal status.
- Political factors No statistics are produced by a government 
which de facto has ceased to exist as in the case of Lebanon and 
Chad. In such circumstances law and order means the supremacy of 
the locally powerful for which there may be more information 
(Spear, 1951). On the more analytical level a crisis of 
confidence in politics becomes a crisis in law and order 
(Wilkins, 1970) which means the absence of information on which
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law and order decisions are based.
The extent to which the government uses the police as an
instrument for its own stability and support and for political 
coercion will affect law and order decisions. The public may be 
unable or unwilling to make the proper distinctions between the 
respective roles of the police. The Republic of South Africa is 
a case in point. Perhaps a more extreme case would be
contemporary Iran in which law and order, de facto, seems to be 
in the hands of young revolutionary guards who impose their own 
interpretation of Islamic values on society without prior court 
hearings or much less any recording of details (Economist, 17
July 1982).
Any government faced with an external political situation which 
threatens its own internal security will give high priority to 
this threat and accord a much lower priority to its internal 
public relations. Many developing countries have to contend 
with civil unrest in neighbouring territories and they find
themselves either ideological havens or unwilling hosts to 
counter-revolutionaries and freedom fighters' trying to gain 
power in their own countries as in Lebanon, Sudan, Cuba, Thailand 
and Angola.
A further important factor is the extent to which a state - 
because of geographical or economic weakness - is under the 
political influences of another sovereign state. Subservience 
to the 'superior' country's ideology must influence the form of 
the law and order policies pursued in the dominated country, eg 
Lesotho, Namibia and Vietnam.
- Social Factors The legal systems of the advanced Western 
nations have developed over a long period as a response to the 
urbanisation and industrialisation that has occurred. 
Consequently, the use of alternative or parallel legal systems 
and policing procedures is severely limited. In the developing 
countries these changes have been rapid and they have led to the 
traditional system surviving in a form both convenient to and 
highly adaptive to the needs of large numbers of their citizens 
who live in the rural areas and in the more densely populated 
poorer parts of the cities. But parallel to this will be the 
official law and order system of the state.
Thus law and order statistics will reflect the needs of a 
minority who have either fully adapted, culturally, to the 
modernised state or who have specialised needs for using its 
legal system. By contrast, the needs of those using the parallel 
traditional system - who probably constitute the majority - will 
not be recorded. This parallel system will contend with many 
specialised social needs involving magic, religion, polygamy, 
matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance and land use. In such a
-11-
situation it can be seen that, both de facto and de jure, 
enormous gaps will exist in the available law and order 
statistics.
- Religious factors While a specifically Christian legal code is 
not administered by any state, an Islamic code has become 
dominant in Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This religious 
code, formulated either before urbanisation had become widespread 
or industrialisation had occurred, deals mostly with family 
affairs and to a lesser extent with trading relationships. 
While non-religious, non-sectarian law has developed in response 
to the particular needs of industrialisation, because religious 
codes like the Koranic law cannot handle issues involving the 
pursuit of individual self-interest, urban anonymity and the
development of technology, effectively. The actual application
of the Koranic code, by analogy, to essentially modern issues is 
apt to turn litigants towards methods of informal arbitration and 
away from the formal state system. Even if law and order 
statistics were produced on the basis of such a system, it is 
difficult to see what would be their immediate value since there 
would be no comparable material to use in analysis and no 
available datum line from which to measure trends.
Developmental factors In developing countries the state is 
often the only institution that is openly coercive in a wide 
range of areas including law and order. In such situations it 
is sometimes the case that the government adapts its law and 
order statutes in response to modernising issues as it alone 
conceives them according to its particular philosophy or 
ideology. Consequently, the majority of its citizens feel more
inclined to distance themselves from an institution which is both
socially detached from them, mechanical in its operations and 
outside their personal influences (Bayley, 1969) .
Another important factor is the nature of the legal system which 
has contributed greatly to the gap between the law and order 
wishes of most citizens and what their governments provide. In 
this, the influence of the legal profession has been particularly 
dominant in all questions of non-traditional law. The members 
of the profession have been trained to the legal standards of 
developed nations and they have an in-built need to extend the 
range of this legal system which they see not only as the best 
way of dealing with matters in dispute but as providing their own 
livelihood. They promote their own profession and industry in 
proposing the introduction of particular laws that they regard as 
necesary. They construct the laws themselves in their capacities 
as legal draftsmen and they encourage the use of the formal legal 
process wherever posible as it is in their interests to do so. 
The courts provide prestige for all those involved as judges and 
lawyers as well as for anyone who uses them (Dodd, 1979).
In theory, in respect of the rational-goal model it is possible
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to evaluate law and order statistics in terms of the overall aims 
and objectives defined. In the case of the organic model, 
however, it is not known (or rather it can only be guessed) what 
are the premises on which the policies are based. This makes it 
much more difficult to assess the value of the law and order 
statistics produced under this approach.
C The bureaucratic imperative
Weber conceived of bureaucracy as being the most rational and the 
most efficient form of administration. He based his ideas on 
the administrative machines of modern governments and large-scale 
business organisations. Perhaps it may even be considered one 
of the evolutionary universals, with its division of labour and 
hierarchical structure of officials (Parsons, 1964). In the 
developing nations, however, several deviations from the ideal 
type can be seen. These have their effect on the quality and 
quantity of law and order statistics since such an organisational 
structure can only be the most efficient way of organising 
large-scale operations when all the necessary parts have some 
equivalent competence. The Kenya Prisons' administrative 
machinery was designed for a complex penological policy, 
admirable in theory but impossible to implement effectively in 
practice because of circumstances beyond the control of those 
involved. The educational and administrative standards of a 
developing country do not allow for too much bureaucratic 
sophistication in their prisons (Tanner 1970 (d) 108).
An Indian district administrator once commented:
'There were, of course, precise rules on paper for the 
disposal and inspection of work, but the meticulous 
following of the rules never got one very far, since one 
could easily lose oneself in the jungle, and all the more so 
since one's subordinates were adept at putting up charts and 
statements for the edification of the unwary which were 
impeccable on the surface but not so innocuous underneath' 
(Hunt and Harrison 1980: 86).
There has been an acceleration of the bureaucratic process in 
response to the developed world's ideas of what is the necessary 
basis for planning. It forms a part of the legitimation of the 
authority of the new nation state that is established without the 
social, economic and political uniformities which, to a certain 
extent, have helped to create such authority elsewhere. There 
are general problems involved in skipping certain stages in a 
process of unilineal development in which only some parts of a 
country conform to this pattern of accelerated modern 
development. It is manifested in, eg, highly trained official 
statisticians collating the figures produced by untrained clerks 
in distant offices who are often unaware of the aims of an
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enquiry and who have little interest in such ritualistic clerical 
exercises.
Most developing nations evidence the ever-widening scope of 
governments' bureaucratic activities as possibly an obstacle to 
further evolutionary advance, simply because recording takes up 
such a high proportion of government officials' time. Much of 
this paper work is defensive and protective in the way it is 
produced. It is rarely compiled to further a particular
administrative need. And, sadly, the routine completion of 
records is not seen as any way forward for ambitious young 
officials. The police may be continually distracted from more 
important work by bureaucratic demands made worse by varying 
standards of educational competence and the admixture of 
languages (Bayley 1969).
The defensive use of bureaucracy can be an adaptation to stress 
(Merton 1964) in which the completion of records in some form or 
other is regarded as a process of abstracting some sort of order 
out of what is actually experienced as disorder - in the sense of 
officials being 'out of their depth' in particular situations and 
being unable to cope with them.
THIRD WORLD CONDITIONS INFLUENCING CRIMINALITY
Certain factors, rather more specific to developing countries, 
have a particular bearing on crime statistics. First, there is 
the prevalence of violence as a background to the social 
experience of many Third World citizens, eg the regularity of 
large scale riots in India, civil war as in Nigeria and Cambodia, 
and political and interpersonal violence in Central America, 
Columbia and Mexico (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). These
features are possibly initiated or made worse by the habit of 
agitational politics. This possibility of widespread public 
disorder as the background to the police establishmet (Bayley 
1969: 252) means that such forces have to be prepared for
serious disturbances as an every day part of their working lives.
Secondly, there is the total vulnerability of the peasant who 
makes up the vast majority of the Third World population. These 
low income rural dwellers often live in isolated areas in poor 
housing with flimsy security and they work alone in fields away 
from villages Their principal wealth, their livestock, is 
equally vulnerable. Such other tangible values will be kept 
somewhere in the house or on the persons of wives and daughters, 
which makes them particularly liable to victimisation. Law and 
order for them is usually a purely local affair. He feels that 
he has no duty to assist the state in criminal matters and no
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obligation to report crimes or co-operate in investigations; he 
shows a profound reluctance to get involved in unpleasant 
situations over which he has little control (Bayley 1969).
In situations of poverty or when the standard of living is low, 
even articles of little value which in the developed world can 
usually be left unguarded such as railway keys, coal and 
telegraph wire become objects of crime. Under such conditions it 
is not surprising that a high proportion of thefts appear to be 
of personal or public property which it was not reasonably 
possible to guard. In these conditions there are even
difficulties of identification should the goods concerned be 
recovered.
THE PRODUCERS OF LAW AND ORDER 
A The Primary Recorders
The basic details of the information that subsequently appears in 
the official statistics are usually recorded by the lowest levels
of the civil servants or officials involved, such as police
constables and court clerks, and much must depend on their 
competence to do this accurately. In some countries the medical 
checks on police or civil service recruits are cursory (Bayley
1969) or non-existent. In Nigeria there are no tests of visual
acuity, hearing and mental soundness (Igbovinia 1981) and such 
biological factors must have an influence on performance.
Those who record the information are very often of low education. 
In some cases they may even be virtually illiterate taking 
employment with the police as the last resort. Because the pay 
is too low and there is little chance of promotion, the job does 
not attract the better qualified (Bayley) 1969). Rapid
expansion of the police forces of developing countries must mean 
the rapid promotion of large numbers of junior officers who have 
not undergone any lengthy period of adjustment to new 
responsibilities. The . number of police available is no 
indication of their ability to solve and prevent crimes. The 
results of any shortage of men and experience is likely to be the 
concentration of the better police in the capital cities nd 
important commercial areas (Tanner 1970 b).
The general training of the police may be of a low standard and 
the writing of reports never taught. The result then is that the 
basic records of crimes may be- very poor just because the clerks 
concerned are incapable of being either accurate or consistent. 
The maintenance of records and the recording of evidence is a 
skilled occupation requiring training, practice and supervision, 
all of which is often inadequate. For such persons there is 
very little incentive to keep good records, which is regarded as
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a purposeless activity pursued only with the aim to demonstrate 
to their superiors that they have honoured routine or 
occupational obligations. In the Kenyan prison study
'every type of record keeping was found to be unreliable, 
sometimes inaccurate and very frequently unsystematic... 
This was occasioned not by any lack of effort on the part 
of the officers and warder clerks but by elements in the 
system itself. The majority of records were kept in 
longhand.... Much detail was writen in large cumbersome 
ledgers, each prisoner's records were kept in an open file, 
held together by string at the corner and stacked in a 
cupboard' (Tanner 1970 (d)).
Not only is there the important issue of literacy and education 
but the more complex issues of recording information when the 
language of family origin, the language of the area in which 
events occur and the language of the record are very different. 
In Tanzania, for example, a Sukuma policeman learning Swahili is 
acquiring another language within the same linguistic group in 
which the grammar is very similar but a Massai or Sandawe
recruit would have to learn a language totally different in 
grammatical structure to his own; and both, at times, would 
have to report information in English.
There is not only the general problem encountered by countries
which have a multiplicity of primary languages and a lingua
franca of limited acceptability but a further problem of 
'internal' expatriates. This arrises from the common policy of 
posting officials to outlying provinces beyond the areas to which 
they belong or grew up on. This may complicate the ordinary 
proceses of transferring central government civil servants to 
where they are needed to fill posts because of their doubtful
reliability as perceived by the dominant political group. These 
government servants may be seen at best as strangers, at worst 
hostile intruders. They in turn may regard those whom they serve 
as both savage and backward so that bond of unity between the 
servers and those they serve may not be much more than shared 
political suzereignty (Callagny 1980).
For these recorders of information there is a great difference 
between situations in which the data are reported by a third 
person to the recorder (as with road accidents and reported 
crime) and those where the recorder initiates his own 
investigations and then writes down the results.
Reactive primary recorders In this situation, the police officer 
receives a report from a civilian that requires him either to 
investigate the incident or to react to a public demand to deal 
with an offender who has already been identified. This is often 
the case with domestic assaults, shoplifting and employee theft 
(McClintock and Avison 1968: 109). There may be very little real 
investigative police work to do and records will tend to be kept
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to a minimum consistent with the legal work required. It is 
difficult to get any sense of achievement out of this type of 
work. The police play a relatively minor role in the discovery 
of incidents in which the other groups and companies are in fact 
the generators of these official statistics (Bottomley and 
Coleman 1976).
Police Officers dislike making any formal report when there is a 
close relational distance between the victim and the offenders 
since he knows from experience that whatever he does is likely to 
complicate a quarrel between relatives or between spouses. He 
knows that many reports to the police are not intended to 
initiate prosecutions but to warn or threaten another party 
(Skogan 1975). He is also likely to defer if he possibly can to 
the dispositional preferences of the complainant who may be a 
parent, wife or someone politically important.
In these sensitive areas the goodwill created and maintained by 
individual officers or police stations will be best reflected. 
The more popular the police, the more they will be used and 
consulted on a wide range of issues above and beyond the minimal 
necessities of reporting serious crimes.
Proactive primary recorders There is a wide range of recorded 
data initiated by the police themselves of which most are both 
legally and socially trivial such as traffic offences and 
disorderly conduct (Black 1971). If the policeman wishes to 
achieve notice, he can create his own cases in which the
recording of the crime committed, its detection and associated 
conviction rates coincide. He can create a personal score which 
shows him to be active and energetic.
There is a stronger tendency to be proactive in public places 
rather than on private premises where, in the latter situation, 
there are legal restrictions which may react on the police 
officer who invades the privacy of citizens. The police are
likely in practice to take proportionately more action against 
the poorer people who tend to spend a greater part of their time 
in public places. As a result the police seem likely to be more 
obviously biased in proactive than in reactive behaviour 
(Bottomley and Coleman 1981: 53).
From colonial times and on through independence, a high 
proportion of police activity has been to support and keep in 
power a particular dominant group, eg the Republic of South 
Africa where over 60 per cent of all recorded crimes constitute 
law infringements rather than criminal offences and where 98 per
cent of the former go for trial as against 61 per cent of the
latter (Midgley 1971). The implied racial bias is also 
self-evident in this situation. Even the court clerks recording 
and processing cases may be an important element in statistical 
terms to a certain extent because they usually control the flow
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of cases. They may get so hopelessly behind that the police have 
to stop prosecuting and the courts stop processing for a time.
The police may also have a proactive role in enforcing government 
policies in places where patrolling on a regular basis is rare 
and there are periodic raids to catch a range of offenders 
(Callaghy 1980; Washikongo 1976; Bamisaiye 1974). In 1960 the 
Bombay police filed 96,000 prosecutions against the Prohibition 
laws and in 1962-63 Indian police prosecuted 8 million persons 
for travelling on the railways without a ticket (Bayley 1969). 
Departments may be set given target figures so as to beat last 
years' total of traffic prosecutions. Likewise, individual
policemen may be given specific targets for traffic offences eg 
the completion of a book of traffic summonses for the day which, 
if they succeed in completing, they can be relieved of duty for 
the rest of the day. In one particular year,however, the
Mombasa Criminal Courts handled 644 traffic cases in October, 
1732 in November and 565 in December, whereas the flow of 
reactive cases remained steady throughout the year with little 
fluctuation (Tanner 1970 (b)). The ability of the courts to
handle more than a fixed number of cases in a certain number of 
working days must impose some restraint on police prosecutions. 
The possible hostility of the judiciary may also be another 
factor considered by the police (Tanner 1970 (b) ) .
It must be concluded that proactive cases form a significant and 
growing part of police activity. The initiators of such actions 
are not usually influenced by any question of creating or 
maintaining the goodwill of those citizens in whose areas the 
police serve.
B The Collators Of Information
These secondary stage producers of statistics, usually junior 
clerks, make up returns at regular intervals marking off months, 
quarters and the completion of the year. For them it is part of 
the process of running an office, producing statistics in an 
orderly way, often (if not always) on a prescribed form. They 
may indeed have little interest in what these figures represent 
or they may be produced as part of a particular programme desired 
by the dominant political group. In Tanzania some wildly inflated 
figures of the villagisation programme were gathered at each 
level of government and passed on to the next (Samoff 1981). A 
mere junior collator of information is not going to make his 
position uncomfortable by making critical evaluations of 
statistics of which he is no mote than the passive recipient. 
Police officers are instructed to make up their data to conform 
to certain required norms of completeness, clarity and 
credibility so as to produce a document which has a reasonable 
chance of being useful to the person to whom it is passed, 
provided that this "doctoring" does not remove a defensible 
correspondence between the transformed and original account
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(Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1968).
C The Receivers Of Statistics
Administrators and politicians instinctively see the statistics 
they receive as tools for use in self-protection, political 
in-fighting and for furthering a political cause. They may 
believe the data represent facts and form part of a process of 
ratifying their views (Green 1975).
Since this data can be misused there is often excessive secrecy 
and non-disclosure so that the information may not be shared 
between departments unless specifically authorised. Even if the 
users of statistics wanted to check, it is often extremely 
difficult - by reason of poor communication and distance - to do 
so. Furthermore, nothing in particular is usually to be gained 
by initiating any correspondence about the accuracy of such 
records.
UNRECORDED DATA
In any situation the primary data recorded by the police will 
simply comprise varying proportions of all the actual events that 
have occurred. The universe of crime can never be known as it 
varies with a wide range of personal and institutional factors. 
Any assessment of these must be largely guesswork. Almost no work 
has been done on unrecorded crime in the developing world so that 
this remains one of the major difficulties in assessing levels of 
true criminality.
The amount of unrecorded crime will tend to increase when:
- There is civil unrest and riots
- social change is occurring at a rate which does not 
permit the building up of a compensatory and balancing 
social equilibrium;
- large numbers of strangers enter into a hitherto socially 
homogeneous area;
- immigration into an urban-industrial area occurs at a 
rate at which government cannot provide adequate 
supporting social services;
- the population in any area is demographically unbalanced 
in terms of its age and sex structure.
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The amount of unrecorded crime will tend to decrease when:
- law and order agencies form part of the community and are 
representative of the community in which they are 
operating;
- the community has enjoyed a long period of social 
stability in which the rate of social change has been 
sufficiently slow to allow continuous and even 
adjustment.
The general conditions of the developing world make it very 
possible that the 'dark area' of unknown crime is likely to be at 
least as high as in the developed world and very probably much 
higher for reasons which will now be analysed.
A Unrecorded Crime - Unknown And Not Recorded
Victims may not know that they have been victimised as with young 
children who are sexually abused by relatives and mentally 
sub-normal individuals who are maltreated. With a wide range of 
property crimes, victims may not know immediately that they have 
lost goods. Peasants who have been defrauded by traders or 
confidence men, or who return home after a visit to a distant 
relative or a pilgrimage to find that they have been burgled 
(Maltz 1975) have little chance of discovering when the incident 
occurred. Crops, small livestock and building materials may be 
stolen without the owner knowing that he has lost anything.
It is widely known that companies may not know that they have 
been victimised by shoplifters or employees (Dodge and Turner 
1971), and government departments, farmers and co-operatives may 
also suffer stock" shrinkage" without ever knowing it. Crops 
stores at depots, firewood and coal on the railways, as well as 
livestock, fish, crops etc. on state farms may disappear. In 
situations where there is poor security or no security at all and 
where records are poorly kept and stock checks infrequent, loss 
is likely to account for a considerable amount of unrecorded 
crime. In such cases either the time of the crime or its nature 
or the amounts involved are unknown. Sometimes the crime itself 
is unknown - a theft is not discovered or a murder is considered 
an accident or simply a missing person.
B Unrecorded Crime - Known But Not Recorded
In any consideration of unrecorded crime there is a basic 
analytical framework which suggests there are considerable 
restraints on informing the police. Firstly, who did it? 
Someone with whom there was a known social relationship or 
strangers? Secondly, was it done for economic reasons or
passion? Thirdly, what was the extent of the damage to person.
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property or propriety? Lastly, what were the participants', or 
potential informer's assessments of the burdens and benefits of 
reporting to the police?
Cultural factors There is always a social distance factor 
between the social institutions and ideas of the individual and 
his immediate relatives, friends, fellow tribesmen, caste members 
and local community; and the institutions, practices and ideas of 
the government of the country in which he lives. This difference 
is likely to be wider in situations where the central government 
is a new and largely alien institution than in countries where it 
has developed into its present form over centuries.
In many developing countries, traditional ideas and practices 
survive strongly as the preferred way of settling criminal and 
civil disputes. It is not surprising that these communal modes 
of regulation and codes of conduct are often not recognised by 
the state because, for the most part, they are in tacit
opposition to the state system. In some cases they are seen as 
being actually criminal as attempts to run a parallel state 
(Sumner, 1982). The event and the police seem to belong to
different cultures (Hoebel, 1965; Cohn 1965). Much depends on 
the extent to which each community is organised both to prevent 
and to deal with crime amongst its members. It also depends on 
the extent to which the community or social group is organised to 
commit crimes (Bayley, 1969).
Usually these customary legal norms have a universal application. 
They are universally understood; they have an obligatory
character and operate principally in the area of primary 
relationships, matters in which outsiders are not. involved. The 
individual, family or group may not welcome the intrusion of
outsiders who will isolate the criminal act from the wider
surroundings which they do not recognise, especially where 
neither victim nor witness feels any criminal wrong has been 
commited. Many small community crimes are part of a loose 
network of incidents often going back for years, even centuries:
The author was involved in a violent land-tenure dispute in the
Kodaung Hill Tracts in northern Burma which was probably two
hundred years old; and the 1953 Lari massacre during the Mau-Mau 
rebellion in Kenya was a stage in a land tenure dispute dating 
from the early years of the British occupation (Rosberg and 
Nottingham, 1966).
Many crimes occur within the intimacy of village life. Those 
involved are tied by numerous strings not only to each other but 
to all possible witnesses so that to give evidence to the police 
is choosing sides. In such circumstances it would be
unrealistic to expect litigants to use the courts widely (Tanner, 
1964). Those concerned see little point in making another
person suffer in a mechanical legal process that is outside the 
control of the community. To them it would be clearly better to
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apease the victim by some form of compensation, which would leave 
the village social fabric intact.
Some offences and disputes involve incidents not recognised by 
modern law such as witchcraft (Brillon, 1980; Winans and 
Edgerton, 1965), or matters which the community regard as 
justified like the killing of illegitimate children (Minturn and 
Hitchcock, 1963), adulterous wives, and daughters who have lost 
their virginity outside marriage (Nordenstam, 1968, 96). These 
are concerns which, traditionally, the community feels the 
criminal justice process does not treat seriously enough.
While there is often this clear distinction between the 
traditional culture and the administrative culture of the 
government there are also situations in which minorities do not 
integrate into the dominant culture either as individuals or 
groups. These may be sub-cultures within a traditional culture 
or minority groups in urban-industrial environments, all 
sustained by their own sense of cultural identity (Barbour, 
1980). There may indeed be a factor of ethnicity which affects 
their willingness to request police assistance (Bayley and 
Mendelsohn, 1969). In such circumstances there will be a general 
undercurrent of resistance to the state with reactions varying 
from active to passive non-cooperation acompanied by a feeling 
that their existence is dominated by foreigners whose police make 
them feel the reverse of safe (Callaghy, 1980). Many citizens of 
developing countries are well aware that their modern judicial 
system was not constituted and is not maintained to coincide with 
the wishes and practices of the majority. For them it is part 
of a deliberate move towards political centralisation and control 
and a further step towards imposing cultural uniformity.
Individual factors It is difficult to separate the individual 
from the social environment in which he lives and works. It may 
well be, however, that as he becomes more detached from a 
traditional society and becomes a part of the urban-industrial 
society he will be increasingly influenced in his behaviour by 
more personal and purely individual considerations. He will 
usually weigh in his mind the extent to which the availability of 
government legal institutions provides a more or less convenient 
and more or less effective way of settling disputes than existing 
traditional or quasi-traditional institutions and methods.
Reporting to the police is a time consuming business and for 
someone paid by the hour and likely to lose his job if he takes 
time off, there is not much incentive unless the return will 
outweigh the losses. This is unlikely to be the case in the 
majority of instances of criminality. The same is equally true 
for the rural household dweller. Fields have to be guarded from 
wild animals and birds, stock tended, plots hoed and the grain 
harvested so that a day away might make a serious change in a
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family's well-being for the coming months. For the rural
household family, distance from the reporting centre or 
telecommunications point is another deterrent factor especially 
if the intervening terrain to be covered is difficult or 
inhospitable.
Few will report criminal acts in which they have been willing 
participants such as prostitution, illegal drinking or drug use, 
and much less when they have been victimised by the prostitutes 
through theft or blackmail or robbed by the owners or frequenters 
of illegal bars (Maltz, 1975). Neither are they likely to 
report where they have been unwilling accessories. Victims of 
sexual offences are particularly unlikely to report to the police 
because of the embarrassment and shame involved in the legal 
process -particularly as there are usually counter assertions of 
the victim's own contributory immorality. Such offences are also 
not reported when children and relatives are involved both as 
victim and offender. It has been shown that victims are several
times more likely to recall offences by strangers than by
relatives (Turner, 1972). Where complaints are made the police 
sometimes view them as domestic incidences in which they dislike 
interfering; a further discouragement to reporting offences
(Poliak, 1950).
Well-to-do citizens may fail to report insured losses for fear
that the policy may be cancelled, not renewed or the premiums
increased (Reiss, 1974). No one will report a theft that might 
provide evidence of his own criminal activities such as the theft 
of a previously stolen article or an assault relating to a 
dispute between criminals.
If the victims have had a previous unsatisfactory experience of 
the police or where an unhelpful response is expected, crimes 
will tend to go unreported. This is not easy to assess as the 
quality of the relationship between the police and the
prospective witness is a very subjective matter and will probably
vary from day to day and from matter to matter. It is a function
of what one party thinks the other is capable of doing (Bayley, 
1969). There is no such thing as a person's single attitude to 
the police and few generalise from a particular experience. The 
individual in a developing country has a choice as to which type 
of legal procedure he will use (Nader, 1967; Tanner, 1970 (b) ) . 
Where there are these alternatives, the decision given in any one 
system will be taken as only one stage in the total process of 
settlement. Many will not bother to report their victimisation 
to the police because they do not regard them as effective 
(Center and Smith, 1973) . At best they feel nothing will be 
done; at worst, they suspect the police as untrustworthy or even 
implicated themselves.
It has been shown in West Africa (Oloruntimehin, 1973) that the 
lower classes, the old and women are much less likely to report
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to the police than the young, the men and the upper classes who 
have some sense of identity with government processes.
Political factors relating to criminality by officials A
serious feature' of law and order in developing countries is the 
extent to which the state and its employees are the criminals and 
their citizens are the victims who, furthermore, are deprived of 
any possible recourse to the legal system for justice and 
protection (Lopez-Rey, 1970), Callaghy, 1980; Mushanga, 1976). 
The Uganda police in 1964 would take no action in cases involving 
the military. They also did not record deaths attributable to 
civil disturbances as either murder or manslaughter (Tanner, 
1970 (a)). During the Amin regime many of the deaths, even in 
custody, went unrecorded - and Uganda (or indeed Africa) is not 
an isolated example as recent revelations about "missing persons" 
in Argentina have shown.
That these offences are numerous and widespread is not in doubt 
as the work of Amnesty International regularly discloses. 
Official complaints of military abuse against Philippine 
civilians are reported to be at the rate of 54,000 a year 
(National Secretariat of Social Action, Justice and Peace, 1979) 
Examples are offences against the person; beatings, torture and 
killing for which there is often photographic evidence, as in 
Gabon, Liberia and Cambodia, and the disappearance of large 
numbers of persons (as reported in Chile and Argentina). There 
are also internal illegal deportations and illegal dententlons in 
many countries. There are offences against property such as the 
theft of private property by officials. Corruption at all levels 
of government is widespread. Where both the briber and the 
bribed are pleased with the transaction the crime is not 
reported. Where others may be afraid to complain or distrust the 
police or feel that nothing can be done about it, the offence 
will similarly go unreported. Indeed corruption may be so 
widespread due to the inability of the state apparatus to 
function (as in post-Amin Uganda) that it becomes the main theme 
in the political economy of the state (Green, 1981). The forms 
of corruption are almost infinite; doing, not doing, misdoing, 
doing speedily and maintaining goodwill (Bayley, 1969). 
Corruption is considered to be most prevalent during rapid 
modernisation (Huntington, 1970) and after, rather than before, 
independence (Monteiro, 1966; Dumont, 1966), but little is 
revealed in the statistics. Newly formed governments often 
initiate drives against corruption but this sometimes involves 
summary justice which again may not be' recorded.
There have been numerous occasions on which the civil government 
has not been able to control their own military forces, as in the 
1964 East African army mutinies. The same situation applies when 
the military governments keep their own forces out of effective 
control, as with the police in Brazil who have allegedly executed 
suspected criminals. In Ghana the armed forces have ill- treated
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people appearing before the courts in cases involving the courts 
and forcibly released some prisoners (Economist, 13 March 1962.
64) . In August 1982 the Bombay Police mutinied over a pay and 
union dispute and the police themselves were widely involved in 
criminal acts of looting, arson and assault.
Finally, it must be mentioned that there are offences against the 
state. Rebellions and riots instigated by employees of the state 
which are retrospectively legalised in successful coups d'etat 
but are harshly condemned if they fail inevitably involve 
widespread offences against both people and property. In such 
situations the police may well cease to function to protect the 
public because they are unable to discern who are the criminals 
and who are their present or future political masters.
Political factors relating to criminality in general Civil 
unrest will always reduce the ability of the police to function. 
Little crime will be reported and even less recorded in these 
circumstances. There is, for example, a complete absence of law 
and order statistics throughout the period of the Nigerian civil 
war (Milner, 1972). During any situations of widespread disorder 
in which organised civil government ceases to operate there is no 
intensification of criminality generally. In the 1948
India-Pakistan Partition civil violence erupted during which 
there were innumerable killings by both sides and widespread 
abduction of Hindu women by Moslems (Shiromani Gurdwara 
Parbandhak, 1957).
The recent troubles in Uganda have resulted in large tracts of 
the country becoming effectively out of government control. In 
such areas criminal gangs are too well-armed and organised for 
the police to provide any protection to the citizens there 
(Southall, 1980). In Burma the line between gang criminality and 
political insurrection has often been difficult to distinguish.
There is always a social distance factor between the law as 
constituted by the state, with or without the agreement of the 
community and its representatives, and the attitudes of that 
community to the law. Indeed, many may not even know about the 
imposition of such formal and complex laws or be aware of their 
impact (Thompson, 1977). There is less likelihood, therefore, of 
crime being reported to the police. Where laws are few and 
simple to understand more offences will be reported. The
developing countries have experienced a law explosion and few 
citizens .are likely to know their rights, or the extent of the 
law covering their own occupations and living conditions.
Without any consideration of the rightness or justification for 
the mass imposition of new laws to the population, the expanded 
legal code will affect a far wider range of attitudes than any 
particular matter taken in isolation. The movement of several 
million Tanzanian peasants in the 1974 villagisation campaign may
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have had just such an effect (Samoff, 1981) especially as there 
would have been additional reactions brought on by the use of 
force and the burning of villages (Mwapachu, 1976).
In many situations the new laws run counter to traditional rights 
and beliefs and no assistance at all can be expected from the 
people. Some examples would be the National Park legislation in 
Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia which overrode traditional hunting 
rights; customs and excise laws relating to communities
artificially split by an international border, eg as between 
Ruanda and Urundi with Uganda and Tanzania; and state forest 
laws affecting the local use of timber as in Burma. In addition 
there will be a whole range of totally new laws for which most 
communities will have no need, at least initially.
In this wide range of situations the police become the lightning 
conductors for many of the grievances and frustrations over the 
enactment of new social policies in which they may not themselves 
even be involved (Clinard and Abbott, 1973). Most developing 
countries use the police as the striking force for social 
revolution. In such circumstances any respect for the
traditional police function as servants of the public is under 
threat and it is doubtful if favourable public attitudes can be 
developed (Bayley, 1969; Potholm, 1969). Modern law has been 
institutionalised out of the control of those for whom it 
operates. But both customary and religious (particularly
Islamic) legal systems operate by consensus and the arbitrators 
attain their role by the agreement and respect of the community 
and the parties involved.
Situational factors It is well recognised that urban and rural 
situations are different with respect to crime. In the urban 
environment many more contacts with the police are possible 
without having to go to seek them out. They are an obvious part 
of the landscape and the degree of contact rises with income, 
education and proximity. City people are more likely to have an 
unpleasant experience of police coercion. Many more will have 
seen policemen strike people than in the rural areas (Bayley, 
1969) where the impersonality of the police may be greater.
As indicated earlier, in rural areas reporting a crime may 
involve walking twenty miles on bad roads subject to the vagaries 
of the weather with floods and storms. There are likely to be 
very few telephone connections to rural police stations or to the 
villages More use is likely to be made of local courts in a 
country like Tanzania where there was one court per 1041 square 
kilometres. There will always be a relationship between the 
number of police stations and courts and the number of 
infractions. This is also correlated with the density of
policemen. In Uganda in 1969 there was one policeman per 1300 
population but in the Ivory Coast in 1975 only one per 3652 
population. The ratios are even lower for the capitals with
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Kampala having one in 642 and Dakar one in 535 (Brillon, 1980) .
In the Musoma area of Tanzania failure to report to the police 
cases of cattle theft came about for several reasons (Tanner,
1966) . Cattle owners knew that the police would only send a 
constable who would probably be able to do even less than they 
had already done themselves on discovering the theft. In any 
case, making an official report to the police would have 
prevented the owners from taking popular retaliatory measures 
themselves; swift retaliation was a matter of pride and 
accounted for infrequent thefts in some areas. In the Ikoma and 
Issenye areas of Tanzania some crimes occurred in places which 
were sixty miles from the nearest police station over roads which
were often impassable for long periods during the rains.
In wild and remote areas many crimes would go undetected, 
especially when they occurred within a community but also when 
outsiders were involved because they would not have seen any 
point in reporting crimes. Murders particularly could always be 
attributed to accidents and wild animals. It can be assumed 
that the remoter the district, the less chance there is of crimes 
being reported or properly investigated.
Institutional factors In most developing countries the
organisation and functions of the police represent a continuation
from their colonial past and with this has usually come their
paramilitary and politically supportive nature (Sumner, 1982). 
In many cases the latter are isolated from the general public by 
living in barracks or civil service suburbs. This reflects 
official thinking that the lower ranks need to be shielded from 
civilian social contacts (Bayley, 1969). It is compounded by 
the centralising, inward-looking characteristics of any police 
organisation which discourage outside contacts (Wasikhongo, 1976 
Okonkwo, 1966) . Whether they feel they are popular or not 
police officers will tend to spend most of their off-duty time 
with other police officers in their own 'club1 or in such 
activities as organised sport. In some politically unsettled 
independent states the police have a wide variety of duties 
thrust upon them. Previously these did not take up so many 
officers, so much time and so much equipment. On any one day, 
large numbers of police may be involved in state visits, public 
celebrations, political meetings, presidential tours, security 
and special guard duties for ministers and diplomats. 
Similarly, their distribution on the ground will account in part 
for the level of known criminality. Low density residential 
areas containing senior civil servants, government ministers, 
diplomats and expatriate business managers and experts will be 
relatively well provided with police and telephones (Tanner 
1970(b)).
There is, however, a more important factor affecting the amount 
of unrecorded crime which occurs in many cities and industrial
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areas. In some cases, criminal offenders are processed and 
punished by institutions which have their own private police or 
security force to protect their personnel and property. They 
deal privately with employees who steal money, goods and tools; 
and they deal similarly with a high proportion of outsider 
thieves (Cameron 1964) by private administrative justice (Robin
1967), ie either the agent himself or the group that employs him 
'takes the law into its own hands'.
Private security organisations and their employees initially have 
the same range of discretion as ordinary policemen when they come 
across crime; the developing world has these organisations in 
addition to private armed and uniformed police. In the
Philippines the suburban estates of the well-to-do around Manila 
are well guarded; in other countries and cities it is the same. 
Thus it is likely that a substantial amount of unreported crime 
has been dealt with privately and in an 'ad hoc' way (involving 
often beating-up and/or dismissal) and is not recorded in any 
statistics. Another type of crime which goes unrecorded is 
inter and intra business crime (fraud, etc.) which may be common 
among the richer and more well-established groups in developing 
countries who are seldom prosecuted. It more often goes
undetected because of the inefficiency of external controls, like 
auditing, direct tax system, etc. Whether this group are
businessmen, civil servants or the military, they comprise the 
power elite which is often beyond the law (Heidenheimer 1970) or 
informally involved in it in some form of dubious complicity.
Finally there is a widespread attitude that legitimates much 
theft and fraud upon large private and governmental 
bureaucracies. Extensive pilfering and minor theft is condoned 
and so goes unreported. The social distance is too great for 
moral constraints to be operative particularly in developing 
countries (Smigell and Ross 1970). This applies whatever the 
political complexion of the government; colonialist, capitalist, 
socialist and communist. Socialist Tanzania's Minimum Sentences 
Act 1963 was in part a response to theft of government property, 
theft by public servants and petty corruption. Cuba has
experienced a serious growth in economic crimes against the state 
(Salas, 1979) while the frequency of reported violence has been 
reduced (Brady 1982). It is perhaps inevitable that as the 
institutions and functions of governments in developing countries 
become more widespread, they should become increasingly the 
victims of crime.
FALSE RECORDED DATA
a) Falsified by the police
Given the frailties of human nature, it must be expected that the
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police may wish to record more or less of the crimes which are 
known to or reported to them. It cannot always be assumed that 
the recorder of information wants to provide accurate data or 
that he is capable of doing so. An ambitious police commander 
may consistently produce low crime totals to give the impression 
that he is well in control of his district's crime situation 
(Bohrnstedt 1970; Maltz 1975). There have been cases of 
substantial under-recording of crime although incidents were 
initially recorded (Wolfgang 1968). The crime rate can be 
significantly lowered by attributing criminal damage to under-age 
children and reducing the scale of serious theft by 
systematically undervaluing the property stolen (Seidman and 
Couzens 1974). This situation can often be detected where 
declining crime rates are associated with population increase, eg 
India (Bayley 1969).
In a rural police station the police officer has a vested 
interest in stability and good relations with the communities in 
his area and he would not want to record crimes for which police 
action would be counter-productive and have no communal support. 
Even in urban areas, cases may be settled out of court by a small 
payment made direct to the police and the files of proactive 
cases can mysteriously vanish (Southall 1980).
There is a range of cases where the police will not proceed with 
the investigation of an incident because of their estimate of the 
investigation time required to produce adequate evidence, how 
long it would take to get a court hearing and the chances of 
getting a conviction (Manning 1977). If crimes are unlikely to 
be detected such as the burglary of mud and wattle houses or the 
theft of home produced articles, they may not be recorded at all 
and the 'clean-up' rate will look more respectable (Bottomley and 
Coleman 198). Conversely, there may be increases in recorded 
crime and low detection rates related to police wage claims 
implying a competitive move for an increased share of total 
public expenditure.
Data may be held 'back' in a policeman's or detective's notebooks 
to be recorded when it could be used against a particular 
criminal. Without any question of corruption, there may be a 
downgrading of crime to make it less serious so that there can be 
a better likelihood of getting pleas of guilty. This could also 
arise when the police feel that the full charge would cause a 
defendant undue harm or when attempting to avoid collateral harm 
in sexually oriented cases (Daudistel et al 1979). Policemen, 
who are frequently aware of the difficulties of getting a case 
through the courts on the basis of what is first recorded, may 
record either as little factual information as possible - filling 
in the relevant details as the investigation proceeds - or record 
as much as possible even asking informants to go away and obtain
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more detail before the investigation is yet in motion (Bayley 
1969) .
Apart from the obvious cases of corruption in which the police 
receive material benefits for falsifying their records, they may 
do this where they feel so certain of their suspect's guilt that 
it makes the facts unimportant. They then produce false 
evidence, rig identification parades and even hire witnesses, 
particularly when trying to lodge cases against ex-convicts who 
do not have convincing alibis. They may also falsify and 
fabricate evidence as much to defend themselves against 
over-critical judges as to ensure the conviction of a suspect on 
too little evidence (Bayley 1969).
Police may also alter information under social pressure or to 
show favouritism. As individuals the police remain members of 
their own extended families, clans, tribes and castes. They are 
subject to political and cultural influence, conniving at false 
information and the padding of cases. Above all, the police will 
alter their information to make it conform exactly to legal 
requirements. Any offence will have its various constituent 
elements to which the information contained in police notebooks 
and crime reports must conform (Bottomley and Coleman 1976). At 
a higher level, there may be political reasons for altering the 
data in particular cases, and also for raising and lowering the 
apparent crime rate generally. Falsification of statistics can 
take place at any or all administrative levels but it may be more 
difficult to implement such alterations above the primary level 
when there is a computerised command and control system 
(Chatterton 1979). Finally a crime may not be reported because of 
simple human failing or weakness on the part of the policeman on 
duty.
b) Falsified by the victims
People reporting that they have been victims of crimes may be 
making the accusation for a connected motive. The court case may 
only be a stage in an extra-legal traditional process in which
the report to the police is an additional pressure for
settlement. It may have the direct private purposes of revenge 
and punishment, rivalry or establishing an alibi for another 
matter. Evidence abounds of offences reported to have occurred 
at non-existent addresses or in which victims give false names 
and never appear again, or where an inflated loss or a bogus loss
is reported in order to claim higher compensation or the
insurance (Seidman and Couzens 1974). In this group there will 
be those who report to the police just to be reassured that 
police are available (Maltz 1975) as well as the mentally 
disturbed and senile of which every large town has its examples
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(Rubinstein 1973; Skogan 1975).
Finally, in all police forces there exist numerous reports of 
crimes that are classified as 'unfounded'. Many such cases are 
unfounded but others would probably be recorded in victimization 
surveys, even though the police might not have established that a 
crime had been committed.
c) Falsified by witnesses
Providing a signed statement to the police in good faith and 
making the same statement on oath in court where one is liable to 
cross-examination are two quite widely separate events. In the 
passion of the moment when the crime is in the forefront of his 
mind, the witness may freely make a report to the police. Later 
on he will see this crime in the context of the community in 
which it occurred and in which he still lives. He will be 
subject to the very personal pressures of those involved so that 
by the time the case comes to trial, not only will many of the 
details have become vague or blurred but the complainant or 
witness will see his evidence as necessary to support a 
particular viewpoint for which he will receive continuing social 
support. The prevalence of intrigue in these small tightly knit 
communities will always make it difficult to hold tightly to bare 
facts. In India the repudiation by a witness of his earlier 
statements to the police may account for half of the cases in 
which the police fail to get a court conviction (Bayley 1969). 
Even if the prospective witness is prepared to hold to his story, 
he may quite simply fear retaliation either against his person or 
his stock or his land and property.
While within the traditional system the oath to tell the truth 
may have power to prevent lies, it will not be used in situations 
in which lies are inevitable since the witness has no other role 
but that of being partisan to one party or another (Bohannan 
1957) . The oath in court has no such power and it is rarely a 
strong enough factor to force a witness to override his partisan 
commitments. The difficulties of being a witness and the reasons 
for agreeing to be a witness are common to all. It can be an 
embarrassing process because no one likes to have their veracity 
publically questioned and it is almost certainly a costly process 
in terms of the time and money lost. In general there are few if 
any inducements for a witness to appear and the low or
non-existent reimbursement of his expenses are unlikely to offset 
his losses at critical times of the year. Perhaps only the
well-to-do and the totally unemployed may be able to come to 
court without some economic suffering. Trials drag on and 
memories fade so that most witnesses become progressively less
reliable particularly if the defence lawyers can get repeated
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adjournments. Witnesses also feel nervous when facing lawyers 
known by reputation to make insulting suggestions about their 
statements or characters and the reasons for coming to the court. 
They feel threatened when lawyers cast doubt on the evidence 
itself and sometimes retract certain statements under such 
personalised pressure. Others feel flustered by the formal 
procedures (Bayley 1969).
Some will not consider the government court system to be as 
responsive to justice as the community in which they live or as 
they themselves conceive it and, whilst not revealing it, they 
could be regarded as hostile witnesses. Individuals may give 
tip-offs to the police because they have grudges against the 
offender. Others stand to gain by helping the police because it 
affords them a supply of goodwill which may prevent the police 
from making further enquiries into matters in which they have 
been involved (Bottomley and Coleman 1981). In addition there 
are witnesses recruited and tutored by the police. In Kenya 
convicts often talked about joining the police on their release; 
this meant being regular informants for which they might receive 
some minor benefits (Tanner 1970d).
INACCURATE RECORDED DATA
While at each end of the scale there are completely accurate and 
completely false statistics, in between there is much data which 
is inaccurate or incomplete for incidental reasons. The 
recorders do not mean to be inaccurate but they have neither the 
means nor the will to be accurate; there is a 'grey area' between 
what is reported by the public and what is officially recorded.
Data may be absent from police and court records for a variety of 
reasons (Wasikhongo 1976) including oversight, laziness, 
incompetence and pressure of other work which has to take 
priority. In an examination of some court data it was found that 
the courts did not ask from where litigants came, nor if they 
were Moslems, before applying Moslem law to them. This meant in 
practice that the court officials were unable to comply with the 
requirements of the law as they did not have the relevant basic 
information (Bohmer 1978) .
Local differences in training and lack of supervision may be 
revealed in the variations in recorded data between adjacent 
police jurisdictions with similar social environments (Skogan 
1975). in Nigeria the sentences for corporal punishment passed 
by northern local courts were apparently added in error to the 
figures for magistrates courts so that for 1962 the totals of 
corporal punishment sentences rose from 93 to 3806. Similarly 
the reported rise in crime in Western Nigeria from 1812 in 1955
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to 27,488 in 1964 was so dramatic that some error must be assumed 
(Milner 1972). Indian crime statistics have also produced some 
surprising totals. In 1963 only 4000 more serious crimes were 
recorded than in 1949 although the population had grown by 107 
millions. At that time the serious crime rate was reported as 
only 115.6 per 100,000 with the equivalent rates for England and 
Wales being 2382.7 and the United States 1,226.2. Less than 2.5 
per cent of all recorded crime was committed by persons under 21, 
whereas in England and Wales it was 23.7 per cent (Bayley 1969).
At a lower level errors can often be found where, for example, 
police districts have no cases awaiting trial at the end of the 
year (Tanner 1970b). Some cases are investigated by police of 
low rank and minimal education. In other cases there may be only 
'armchair' investigations with junior policemen being sent out 
to do perfunctory investigations. Sometimes the scene of the 
crime is never visited-as with petty, bicycle and car thefts 
(Bottomley and Coleman 1981). There are other well-known 
difficulties concerning incidents which occur near the end of a 
duty shift when the police involved avoid starting any new paper 
work or do not react to a call that would delay them going off 
duty (Manning 1977;) Overall there is the basic factor that
even when everyone involved is telling the truth to the best of 
their ability, the victim's, witnesses' and police officer's 
perceptions of the same event are very likely to be different in 
important respects: suspects are always ready to offer
counter-charges and alternative explanations. In situations 
where the offence is dyadic with both sides contribution to the 
offence, the police may split the blame, releasing or charging 
both parties, or apportion the blame to one party simply for 
legal reasons (Curtis 1974; Skogan 1975). Thus what is recorded 
and the social realities of the event are quite different. The 
traditional range of contributory guilt is likely to be very much 
wider than any legal limitation as occurs, for example, over 
contributory negligence in the loss of personal effects 
(Bottomley and Coleman 1981). Parents may make complaints to the 
police about the injuries of their children which they assume to 
be from criminal assaults which the police attribute to fair 
fights (Conklin and Bittner 1973).
In other circumstances the data may not be available; the prison 
files of long-term Kenyan convicts contain a space for 
psychiatric observations in which it is rare to find any 
statements recorded. Certainly a common feature of these
long-term prisoners' records was the very high proportion of 
uncompleted details and this vitiated the usefulness of this 
particular system of record keeping (Tanner 1970d): a murder
case file recording the cause of an incident might state 'trivial 
quarrel of unknown origin' and, in the absence of post mortem 
facilities, many reasons for suspicious deaths amount to no more 
than guesswork. Most police stations do not possess even the
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simplest forensic equipment. In rural areas with few police, it 
will often prove impossible to keep onlookers away from the scene 
of the crime so that much evidence could be destroyed. It is 
rare that physical clues can be speedily examined or that they 
can be examined at a convenient distance from the scene of the 
crime. A country may only have one forensic laboratory located 
in its capital, and in some small countries there may be no 
laboratory at all. The police ■ then have to rely on the 
laboratories of neighbouring but not necessarily friendly 
countries. Police officers sometimes do not have maps or they 
are unable to read them. Furthermore, in the absence of any 
formal system of house addresses, locations may be inaccurately 
recorded. Times of crimes may not be related to watches and vary 
with the sun and cloud cover. Data may just disappear through 
flood, fire, white ants and even pilfering. The case file in 
Tanzania of an American Peace Corps volunteer accused of 
murdering his wife was missing from the Mwanza High Court 
reg istry.
Any federal state or country with large numbers of police and 
court jurisdictions having distinctive social characteristics 
automatically faces a serious problem over the reliability and 
consistency of its statistics. There may be variations in 
terminology and interpretations between jurisdictions; robbery 
and rape in one may be theft and indecent assault in another 
(Chappell 1976). A very thin line can separate specific 
classiciations which may vary with the police officers on duty as 
occurs, for example, between stealing a car and the unauthorised 
use of a vehicle, between theft and robbery, and between the 
various gradations of assault. In Uganda there were variations 
in assault charges at some police stations which appeared to 
relate to whether there was a doctor available to make the 
necessary examinations and testify to the degree of seriousness 
of the injuries received (Tanner 1970b). Police may make, errors 
in crime classifications according to their own sub-cultural and 
individual values (Ferracuti et al 1962) that may reflect 
linguistic and religious differences. Observed variations 
between various jurisdictions may be official, conventional or 
habitual.
From time to time there are differences between state, 
departmental and central government statistics supposed to be 
recording the same data. The examination of Nigerian law and 
order statistics (Milner 1972) shows some of these variations: 
the totals of regional crime returns do not always tally with 
published federal annual returns; annual reports of crime differ 
on average to the extent of 30,000 cases either way and, in the 
past, some states even failed to produce any published figures, 
eg in the years following regionalisation. The police sometimes 
record a crime in a specific category which should be amended 
when the charge is changed after further investigation or court 
verdict. If they fail to amend their returns the courts and
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police will, in good faith, produce two sets of irreconcilable 
statistics.
In any long catalogue of human failings in the recording of 
accurate law and order statistics there are three stages. First, 
there is the presence or absence of instructions from the Chief 
Justice's office and Police Headquarters as to how the data is to 
be recorded. In the absence of handbooks for criminal 
statistics, it can only be guessed as to what is included under 
the headings of 'no crimes', 'refused charges', 'cautions' and 
'informal solutions' and how standard entries such as the value 
of stolen property are decided upon (Bottomley and Coleman 1981). 
Secondly, there is the failure to be accurate for a wide range 
of personal, social, economic and political factors. Thirdly, 
the absence of adequate supervision to check and correct records 
perpetuates and even perpetrates distortions. Occasionally the 
inaccuracy is politically motivated when the government wants 
lower crime rates to be recorded as evidence of the success of 
their policies (Center and Smith 1973; Morrisey 1972).
Even when the accused and the crime are known to the police, the 
data may not be ultimately recorded, because each case is sifted 
through a variable mesh of interest, influence and bribery 
(Bamisaiye 1974). The existence of records, may merely reflect 
the fulfilment of a bureaucratic requirement (Skogan 1975).
RECORDED DATA
a) Primary data
In these situations, as earlier indicated, the recorder is in 
direct contact with the information that is being recorded. The 
scene of the crime or of the traffic accident is visited and 
statements by the victims and witnesses are taken down. Victims 
also approach the police directly. The more cordial the 
relationship between the police and the people and the greater 
the trust and confidence in the law maintenance authorities, the 
greater will probably be the amount of reported crime.
The recording of data is in many cases a deductive process which 
often depends upon being aware of the available alternatives or 
having a specialist available to define them. The absence of a 
psychiatrist may well mean the underrecording of accused persons 
who were mentally ill (Bienen 1976) or alternatively, to insanity 
being recorded as a fact when it can only be an opinion.
Discretion factors Once an event is reported to the police, 
they exercise their discretion in whether to recognise it as a 
possible crime. At every stage of the criminal justice process 
thereafter the police and the courts have discretion as to 
whether or not to proceed. The most important use of discretion 
is that used by lower-ranks of the police force; in many cases a
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relatively untrained policeman, the nature of whose work is not 
open to supervision, decides whether there is a probable crime or 
not. This discretion is a necessary part of the legal system but 
how it is used is largely unknown. In many developing countries, 
mainly because of the isolation of police stations and poor 
supervision, the police have an enormous amount of discretion 
(Bayley 1969).
Thus the law provides those empowered to administer it with 
endless options. The more law that is provided by the state, the 
wider becomes the range of discretion given to each and every 
policeman (Pepinsky 1975). Much of this discretion in criminal 
matters depends upon how the police are mobilised for it, the 
priorities they observe and the extent of their specialised 
knowledge. If they do not send traffic police to patrol a 
particular road or to test possible defective vehicles there will 
be no possible offences over which they need to exercise their 
discretion (Reiss 1974).
There are also uses of discretion which are of questionable 
legality. However independent the police and courts may be in 
constitutional theory, ultimately any important law and order 
decision is a political one (Davis 1969). Senior government 
officials are not prosecuted for criminal offences either in 
Uganda (Southall 1980) or in Ghana (Economist 3 July 1982) . Yet, 
in trying to withstand such pressures, three High Court judges 
were murdered in Ghana (Economist, 10 July 1982) and when Amin 
came to power, the Chief Justice of Uganda was killed.
Any criminal case should stand on its own merits in law, but the 
deference which suspects show to the police and their demeanour 
then and in court later, influence police and judicial discretion 
to enforce the law (Reiss 1974). Deference to those of higher 
status with whom suspects have contact also affects subsequent 
legal decisions (Skogan 1975; Black and Reiss 1970).
Uncooperative juveniles tend to increase their chances of being 
arrested and are many times more likely in court to receive a 
severe rather than a lenient disposition (Piliavin and Briar 
1964) .
The illegal use of discretion occurs when the police impose their 
own sense of justice by beating and releasing suspects or even by 
murdering them. Such cases are known to have taken place in the 
Republic of South Africa, Brazil and Uganda but rarely will there 
be any record of them in the official statistics.
Legal factors Generally, the developing nations have
considerably expanded the scope of their laws. Potentially, 
there are now criminals whose fathers and grandfathers could not 
have been accused if they had committed the same acts. In 
Singapore the use and possession of cannabis was made a criminal 
offence which raised the numbers of committed drug offenders
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although it is doubtful whether this increase faithfully mirrored 
any actual increase in drug use (Koh 1974). Deeriminalisation of 
certain offences would have had the reverse effect. There are
also important factors in the specificity of the law; to convict 
needs the fulfilment of the intent legally establishing each 
offence (Lloyd 1977) whereas in traditional justice a wider range 
of more social factors is involved.
In traditional justice much of the processes of social life are 
public and privacy as a restraint on this process does not exist. 
With government law there is a clear distinction between what the 
law can do with actions taken in public and those occurring in 
private. The data recorded will always record a very high 
proportion of crimes in public over which the police require no 
preorganised legal justification. Since- it is mainly the poor 
who spend a high proportion of their time in public, the data 
will reflect this feature in most urban areas. There are 
constraints on the police in matters regarding the legal 
protection of privacy. The police have to be invited to 
participate in 'private' incidents or they have to go through 
legal procedures in order to gain access (Reiss and Bordua 1967).
Although crimes are reported to the police by victims, the law 
enforcement social structure filters the data to produce a final 
product (Littrell 1973) . This information can be organised 
differently with equal correctness but it is orchestrated to meet 
the demands of statutes and judicial practices and it is 
presented so as to withstand legal scrutiny. Crime as defined 
is a legal box (Rose 1969). Court statistics may better reflect 
comparative workloads than features of crime.
Institutional factors The organisation of the police force 
affects the amount of crime that is recorded. More crime is 
recorded in towns than in the country, not necessarily because 
more crime is committed there but because there are more police 
stations which are thus more convenient to visit (Brillon 1980). 
When a new police station is constructed it becomes convenient to 
report a range of offences which previously were not sufficiently 
important to justify the time and effort involved in reporting to 
a more distant station (Tanner 1970 (b)) .
The reorganisation of the police force may also result in large 
numbers of crimes being reported. The introduction of a central 
communications centre receiving all emergency calls previously 
only made to individual police stations will increase the number
of crimes (Wolfgang 1968). In Uttar Pradesh, India, a campaign
to ensure the complete recording of all crimes raised the figures 
for gang robbery by 78 per cent, ordinary robberies by 98 per 
cent and murders by 23 per cent (Uttar Pradesh 1960).
When the enforcement of a particular group of crimes is
concentrated in a single department rather than dispersed among
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several departments this is likely to increase reported crime 
because this department will have a vested interest in justifying 
its existence with a larger figure of known crime. Singapore 
created a new Central Narcotics Bureau to deal with drug offences 
and this led to an increase in drug prosecutions (Koh 1974).
In urban areas the police, by their very numbers, will be much
more involved with non-criminal violators and particularly 
traffic offenders. Law enforcement statistics will reflect 
this, not necessarily because the police are more active but 
because the offences become more obvious where there are large 
numbers of buses, cars, lorries and bicycles. If the discretion 
of policemen on the beat is reduced so that they cannot deal with 
minor incidents unofficially, the crime rate is bound to rise; 
only because the number of reports has grown (Center and Smith 
1973) .
As the value and amount of insured property increases, not only 
will there be more crimes reported by victims but also more 
enquiries from insurance companies which leads to a greater 
number of crimes being recorded (Reiss 1974).
Policy factors Public opinion and political climate may affect 
not only what the police act upon and thus record (Bayley 1969) 
but how the courts deal with the cases brought before them. In 
Singapore when the authorities launched an offensive against the 
drug user (who had become the symbol of the counter culture which 
the government regarded as a threat) the police started to arrest 
opium addicts over 50 years of age who had previously been exempt 
(Koh 1974). Other policies may affect police priorities in 
dealing with incidents such as wife-beating or rape. If the 
police assign high priority to any class of offences this will be
reflected in a high proportion of cases being taken up as well as
cleared up. If the same priority was given to burglary as to 
murder in terms of police resources, it is probable that the 
clean up-rate for burglary would rise dramatically.
The police may have a policy to refuse to accept charges by 
victims in which the lost property is of little value or the 
offence is difficult to define. Petty theft or deception and 
unlawful sexual intercourse with girls just below the legal age 
of consent - where age is difficult to prove - are particularly 
likely to be refused (Bottomley and Coleman 1981).
Where it is a government policy for the police to deal only with 
crime and to serve public law and order needs as the public of 
their own free-will define them, then the statistics will 
obviously reflect this. If, on the other hand, the police are 
used as one of the principal agents for social renovation and 
reform, then the statistics will reflect this policy in both 
their character and quantity. There is little doubt that the 
police in developing countries have increasingly been used in
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this way. Such processes bring the police into contact with 
those segments of society which were not previously thought of as 
criminal. The activities of these groups create new classes of 
offenders outside traditionally accepted criminality and often 
place the police beyond the range of traditional support and 
goodwill. The prohibition of alcohol, land redistribution, 
compulsory villagisation, border interests, interstate movements, 
'pass' laws, profiteering, blackmarket activities - the list is 
virtually endless. In Delhi, March 1964, the police deflated the 
tyres of 4000 bicycles in one evening as part of a traffic safety 
campaign and its effect on goodwill must have been negative 
(Bayley 1969) .
Cultural factors The police and courts, just as any other 
long-standing social group or institution, have distinctive 
sub-cultures in which viewpoints are pre-determined. (Daudistel 
et al 1979). This sterotyping affects their attitudes not only 
towards suspects but also to victims and witnesses. Police and 
court reaction to prostitutes, vagabonds, drug-users, the very 
old and the very young is probably unsympathetic (Bottomley and 
Coleman 1981).
Once there is real or imagined information that a specific 
minority group, particularly one with easily visible or 
identifiable ethnic, tribal or caste characteristics, commits 
more crime than other groups (Mays 1963) it will lead to greater 
police saturation of their locality. This will turn up more 
crime and more arrests than would otherwise occur (Geis 1965). 
Furthermore, as there are widespread cultural differences, this 
will affect the character of recorded crime (Sparks et al 1977: 
189). The police may not bother to record intra-communal
violence since they see it as part of the group's normal 
behaviour.
Total neighbourhood characteristics permit certain forms of 
behaviour to take place while inhibiting the occurrence of others 
(McBride and McCoy 1981), particularly with respect to them being 
reported to the police .Once outside the tight village community, 
the proportion of reported crime tends to rise. Generally, the 
more individualised the victim has become through urban living 
and involvement in industry and business, the more likely is a 
crime to be reported. The motives which lead non-victims to send 
or rather not send for the police are unknown (Skogan, 1975) but 
it is probable that it is not usually done for reasons of serving 
the public good. The reasons are much more likely to be those of 
jealousy, revenge, the furtherance of another dispute, financial 
or other gain, ingratiation, etc. (Cohn 1965).
Situational factors The decision to record a crime is the 
result of personal report and interaction. Distinct and
observable offences form little part of the generality of crime 
as known to a community or the police (Black 1970).
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There are many situational factors in urban living, with shops, 
houses, moveable property which make for higher crime rates. 
Crowds, such as at rush-hours, markets, football games, bus and 
train arrival and departure points etc., provide opportunities 
for crime and may in certain circumstances provoke criminogenic 
environments.
b) Secondary data
The information available to the collater of data has often 
already been filtered through a primary institution where it was 
originally recorded. Basic data may be excluded from the 
published court records (Bienen 1976; Bohmer 1978).
Local interpreters are a particular source of inaccuracy as they 
are often low-paid and non-specialist. Sometimes in the case of 
little known languages two local interpreters may be used to pass 
information from the language of the witness to the lanuage of 
the court (Bienen 1976). To do such work requires considerable 
intercultural understanding and skill and unless someone in the 
court or police station is conversant with both languages, 
mistakes will be made. Furthermore, such 'interpreters' 
interpret rather than translate statements verbatim. If the 
collator finds errors in the primary data there is little that 
can be done to rectify them so the figures are altered to conform 
and make the totals consistent.
STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
Observers generally assume that the smaller the country and the 
smaller the number of reporting agencies, the greater the 
accuracy in the statistics of crime (Court 1976: 151). The
sheer size of some countries and the areas of particular 
jurisdiction prevents the effective individual control of 
supervisors and clerks except irregularly because of the expense 
and the time involved in travel away from their headquarters. 
Checking by letter and comment requires a high level of literacy 
and interest if it is to be effective. In some cases, as in 
Angola, government statistics are not published because there is 
nobody to collect and analyse them (Economist, 24 July 1982:
65) .
In developing countries, in the collation of law and order 
statistics, precise, alien categories are imposed upon highly 
variable social events (Sumner 1982: 10). The interpretation of 
the data therefore requires the extensive examination of primary
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material if any sociological use is to be made of them. At best 
the categories used are shorthand reference terms (Sudnow 1965). 
This however means that the court statistics tend to be as exact 
as trained lawyers can make them. Cases are completed in set 
ways according to set categories. Even though only a minority of 
cases reach the courts, they have an accuracy of their own which 
can be used. The resulting records may also be more accurate 
because the court officials, particularly those in the higher 
courts, are more likely to be competent in the language in which 
the laws are written and the proceedings conducted (Tanner 1970 
<b)).
Few of the clerks have any interest in the veracity of what they 
are recording and the procedures and methods in use are so 
scientifically crude as to have little value on their own except 
as indicators of certain forms of police and court activities. 
Perhaps such data could be referred to more properly as forming 
another part of the ritualisation of government. In almost all 
statistics criminal variables are measured imperfectly or not 
measured at all. Data concerning marital status, religion,
employment status, age, geographical and ethnic origin are rarely 
recorded. Only where such information is clear and precise will 
the variables be recorded with any clarity; the employment status 
of a senior civil servant is unambiguous, someone who is married 
according to civil law, or who possesses a known address and 
whose parents are of the same tribal or caste origin can be 
'defined' easily. But many others fall in between somewhere. 
Where the data are recorded on any scale it is likely to be 
modified by a wide range of influences, most of which can only be 
hinted at (Yunker 1982) . The Singapore data for drug offences 
did not distinguish between criminal acts resulting from drug 
abuse - acting under the influence of drugs; and those related to 
the acquisition of drugs eg theft to get money to buy drugs; and 
offences with no apparent relation to drug use but- concerning 
the manufacturers and sellers (Singh and Joe 1981) . In a study 
of drug addiction in East Africa only Uganda recorded the 
occupations of persons prosecuted for drug offences (Tanner 1966 
(b) ) .
Essentially law and order statistics are designed to be records 
of individuals committing separate and distinct crimes in the 
same way as an illness is individual and distinct. Once the 
records involve multiple offenders and multiple offences, the 
whole system no longer records anything of value beyond the basic 
facts of its multiplicity. Smashing a shop-window or burning a 
house are separate and distinct in every possible category of 
assessment. In India 1963 there were 28,114 cases of riot for 
which all the damage was lumped together. Although this was 
done partially for administrative convenience it was more a 
reflection of the fact that in a communal riot lasting several 
days, there were not enough police available to record each 
individual unit of damage or even the different events involving
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damage. Even had there been, there was only possibility of 
making a charge against any known persons once the riot subsided. 
In August 1946, Calcutta officials collected and disposed of 
3,173 bodies killed in communal rioting. In March 1964 at 
Jamshedpur, 164 bodies were found and in Uganda, after a cattle 
raid, 68 bodies were counted (Tanner 1970 (a)). In such cases
there are not separate case files for every body found, even if 
the names of the dead were known. Legally they were all murdered 
and statistically they were not recorded as such or made the 
subject of individual murder enquiries. Similarly what is 
legally murder but which the communities involved regard as no 
more than simple justice occurs in the mob killings of thieves as 
with 179 known cases in Uganda in 1964 (Tanner 1970 (a) : and
witches (Tanner 1970(c)). In one Ugandan incident seven thieves 
were beaten to death (Clinard and Abbott 1973) and in a well
known incident the President of the Central African Republic 
ordered the beating of imprisoned thieves of whom three were 
killed (Paris Match, 12 August 1972:) In the latter cases numbers 
of men were prepared to admit to participating in these killings 
but they would not be classified as murderers.
As the data are passed up the levels of the official mierarchy 
from policeman to Minister of Justice, they will have situational 
meanings integral to the various states in the assembly of 
official statistics (Cicourel 1968:) At each level they will 
have different uses so that the ex-post-facto readings and
interpretations of statistical record may have little
relationship to the original facts. Once the recording 
procedures have been evaluated, there must be extreme scepticism 
over any interpretation based on them alone (Mays 1963:)
If the work of the police and courts is largely assessed on the 
basis of statistical reports, then they will be compiled with 
this end in mind. Such archival data have an element of 
reactivity in their constitution and this may also reduce their 
primary value (Bayley 1969; Seidman and Couzens 1974). A
further factor in this might be their belief in the value of 
deterrence in restraining further law breaking so that the police 
will pay great attention to a high rate of clearance and devote 
even more attention to this ratio when they have been alarmed by 
accusations of corruption and inefficiency (Box 1971:)
STATISTICAL PREDICTIONS
In general, it can be assumed that, to a large extent, crime is 
the result of a combination of social change, social contrast and 
poverty factors. But there are exceptions to the rule that, as 
developing countries become more urban and industrialised, the
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profile of crime will roughly resemble the pattern of the 
developed countries. The various features are modified
substantially by circumstances and this influences the overall 
pattern. The Japanese crime situation is markedly below that of 
other developed countries though it has had unprecedented urban 
and industrial development and has a criminal justice system 
modelled on that of the West (Clifford 1976).
Whatever the local and national problems, all available 
statistics show levels of reported crime that are unquestionably 
below any estimated levels of crime (Quinney 1970). In some 
cases the recorded levels of reported crime are far higher than 
those in some western countries. The murder rate in Uganda from 
1960 to 1964 varied between 8.31 and 10.05 per 100,000. This was 
well before the civil disintegration of the Amin period for which 
no statistics are available. Nevertheless the data are not much 
different to the US rates for 1974. In 1977, Washington DC and 
the State of Colorado had the highest United States murder rates 
with 27.1 and 16.1 but in 1964 the Buganda county of Buruli had a 
murder rate of 194.9 and Karamajong 45.0 (Tanner 1970(a)).
Poverty is the principal experience of Third World populations 
but initially it was poverty in a society wide sense. Now it is 
poverty in contrast to the affluence which is seen in shop 
windows, the houses of diplomats, ministers and businessmen, 
cars, and expatriates (and perhaps particularly displayed by the 
women) which is now emphasised through the mass media of films 
and advertisements.
Many inhabitants, if not most, are on the knife-edge of survival 
and relatively minor changes in the political, social, economic 
and geographical environments can cause immediate deprivation and 
must lead to an increase in the rates of crime (Radzinowicz 
1971). These increases in crime are not shown in official 
statistics, but it must be concluded that there has been - and 
continues to be - a substantial under-recording of crime and the 
underlying trend is upwards (Chester 1976).
In making any predictions about crime, there is a time-lag that 
has to be taken into account between when the crimes were 
committed and when the data appears on the record at a 
sufficiently high administrative level to be acted upon. It may 
be that a particular series of serious crimes may reach 
ministerial level very quickly but changes in the generality of 
crime may not reach this level until the annual statistics are 
prepared, which could be as much as two years later (Kleinman and 
Lukoff 1981). Even if a case were to be completed within three 
months of first being reported, it might be another year before 
the statistics were collated. Any official reaction to the data 
is thus likely to relate to a social situation which may have 
substantially changed (Yunker 1982).
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Predictions of crime tend to be based on an assumed datum level 
but the rate of social change in developing countries tends to be 
so rapid that the time lag between crimes and assessment makes 
them out of date almost before the forecasts are made. For 
instance, it is assumed that the average age of criminals must 
decrease because of the changing age-sex distribution of the 
population. On the other hand, the exclusion of more young men 
from the normal adult existence once provided by traditional 
society (because of rising unemployment) will probably raise the 
average age of street gang members and provide such groups with 
more educated members (La Fontaine 1972). Similarly, unless the 
expansion of the police forces keeps pace with population growth, 
the ratio of police to people is going to become less and less 
favourable for the maintenance of law and order. This must 
inevitably result in a decline in reported crime as in Buganda 
(Tanner 1965). The prevalence of military training, the flood of 
arms, the desire for consumer goods, and the limitations of 
industrial development, all point to a rise in crime. Only when 
there is a wholesale restructuring of society that diverts 
criminality into new ideologies and political activity is there 
likely to be more stability. Even then there is likely to be a 
change of pattern rather than a Utopian reduction in crime and 
cr iminality.
Always insofar as the legal system is ethical, any crisis in 
political and social confidence tends to become a crisis in law 
and order operations because it operates as an integral part of 
the political system (Wilkins 1970).
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of law and order statistics in 
the developing world is the degree to which they are
instinctively accepted at face value, as if they had the same 
probity as death and birth rates (Center and Smith 1973) which, 
in themselves, can be just as unreliable for a different set of 
individual and institutional reasons. Print alone, even for
official documents, never confers probity on otherwise unreliable 
data. Nevertheless the conversion of weak and confused
statistical evidence into 'hard' figures (as has occurred
recently in the assessment of mugging in Britain and its
identification as part of a dramatic rise in the rate of violent 
crime) still takes place even in developed countries. The
press in any country, whether or not it is directly controlled by
the government, can play a dangerous role in converting data from
controversial impressions to incontrovertible statistics (Hall et 
al 1978) . This type of transformation is all the easier in the
-44-
developing world since police activity tends to focus on the 
urban marginal migrant labourer (Sumner 1982).
As yet there is no widespread development of indigenous
criminology in the developing countries, but what researchers and 
analysts there are, are likely to have been trained in the
developed world. The bias inherent in any research may well be
compounded by contemporary public opinion and the academic world 
outside their countries of origin. There is thus a process of 
internationalisation or expatriatisation of the researcher or 
senior official. Even when they are trained totally within their 
own cultural environment, they will be influenced by their own 
cultural interpretations of events whether these arise from
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